卜振兴

• 1:中国邮政储蓄银行

摘要(Abstract)：

通过理论推导,论证货币政策透明度对于宏观经济效应的影响,并运用TVP-SVVAR模型对我国货币政策透明度与宏观经济波动的关系进行实证检验。结果表明:货币政策透明度有助于减少宏观经济波动,提升货币政策效果;短期来看,透明度对宏观经济波动抑制作用较为明显,但是中长期来看,这种抑制作用会逐渐减弱。为了进一步发挥货币政策透明度在政策执行中的效果,中央银行应进一步加强与公众的交流和沟通,不断提升政策透明度的水平。

关键词(KeyWords)： 货币政策透明度;政策有效性;TVP-SV-VAR模型

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 河北省社会科学基金项目“京津冀银行业过度信贷增长的测度及其风险效应研究”(HB17YJ073)的资助

作者(Author): 卜振兴

DOI: 10.19337/j.cnki.34-1093/f.2018.02.005

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• (1)也即政府出于政治利益考虑人为提高的稳定产出高于潜在产出的部分,例如政府实行的税收和失业保险等政策措施,会对市场产生扭曲,最终导致失业率低于自然失业率水平,均衡产出高于潜在产出。
• (1)其实我国从2006年开始就采用抽样调查的方法统计失业状况,只是数据一直没有对外公布。加入SDDS后,我国计划于2016年开始,由国家统计局发布包含城镇和农村的调查就失业数据。
• (1)该结论是建立在显著性水平为5%的基础之上的。
• (1)与常规参数“置信区间”的表述不同,对于不确定性参数,使用了可信区间的概念。